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More than half of all U.S. casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan were caused 
by improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Despite the spending of over $75 billion 
to combat this threat, intelligence analysts still lack efficient tools to conduct IED 
pattern analysis. This thesis evaluates sinusoidal models for effectiveness in 
assisting in the identification of IED patterns. 
We formulate three models to test against IED patterns encountered in 
Iraq and Afghanistan: the Hawkes point process, the non-linear optimization of a 
sine function, and discrete Fourier transforms (DFT). Non-linear optimization and 
DFT models both outperform a mean inter-arrival model when applied to 
representative IED patterns. We also applied these models against portions of an 
Iraq IED dataset using a rolling horizon forecast. Lastly, we test model 
performance when applied to patterns identified from the Iraq dataset. We 
conclude that although there is not a “silver bullet” for IED pattern detection, the 
use of these models in IED environments has the potential to reduce the amount 
of time and effort intelligence analysts expend when identifying IED patterns. We 
recommend incorporating these models into a graphic user interface usable by 
intelligence analysts responsible for IED pattern recognition.  
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The insurgent weapon of choice in Iraq and Afghanistan is the improvised 
explosive device (IED). According to Gregg Zoroya of USA Today, this crude but 
effective weapon has caused over 50 percent of U.S. casualties and prompted 
the U.S. to spend over $75 billion on new vehicles, armor, and other 
detection/defeat technologies. A report written by the Action on Armed Violence 
spanning 66 countries shows a nearly 70 percent increase in civilian casualties 
due to IEDs from 2011 to 2013. IED statistics suggest that IEDs will remain a 
weapon of choice to target conventional U.S. forces and terrorize civilian 
populations. The objective of this thesis is to improve tactical level targeting of 
IEDs by developing models to assist intelligence analysts conducting IED pattern 
recognition. 
While researchers have developed mathematical models for examining 
IED activity, our approach attempts to identify IED patterns that would allow an 
intelligence analyst to specify a likely date, time and location for follow-on IED 
events. IED patterns are most easily identifiable, both spatially and temporally, at 
a local level. It is therefore necessary to filter the data to only the most recent 
events (we use fewer than 25) in a small area (we do not exceed 40km of road). 
Pattern identification is difficult; most identifiable patterns in Iraq and Afghanistan 
were the result of the cyclical nature of IED supply or coalition force patterns in 
the area. Analysts identified patterns by examining the timing of events in the 
area of interest. Specifically, analysts focused on the time between successive 
events (i.e., the inter-arrival time). As an example, a pattern may consist of three 
to six IED events in quick succession followed by one to two events with longer 
inter-arrivals. The underlying basis for this type of pattern may be an IED supply 
cycle where completed IEDs are available in large batches and emplaced in 
quick succession. The long inter-arrivals may be indicative of spreading out 
emplacements while awaiting the next IED batch. These patterns create distinct 
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sinusoidal shapes when the inter-arrival times are plotted against observation 
numbers. 
Our objective is to identify a model that could clearly distinguish a random 
sequence of inter-arrivals from legitimate patterns. We formulate three models to 
fit a sequence of inter-arrival times. These include the Hawkes point process, the 
non-linear (NL) optimization of a sine function, and discrete Fourier transforms 
(DFT). We artificially constructed ideal versions of several common pattern types 
to use as test data during model development. We also randomly generated a 
sequence to provide a comparison. We measure model performance using root 
mean-squared error (RMSE), comparing model predictions to the actual data. To 
evaluate the model in this phase, we compute the RMSE using the same 
observations that generated model parameter estimates.  
We first test a Hawkes point process model. The Hawkes process is an 
arrival process where one arrival can trigger future arrivals, similar to the 
aftershocks of an earthquake. One IED event may trigger future IED events. The 
Hawkes process performs poorly, however. We believe the primary reason for 
this is that the underlying dataset is small. Hawkes point process is typically 
applied to large datasets. We then use NL optimization to fit a sine function to the 
data, because of the sinusoidal or cyclical nature of common IED patterns. NL 
functions are computationally expensive and therefore are not suitable for 
situations where we have to evaluate thousands of sequences. Our last 
approach uses DFT, which represents data as a linear combination of sine and 
cosine functions, similar to a polynomial function. Closed formed expressions 
exist to fit the DFT parameters, which makes the computational run times trivial. 
DFT is more suitable than NL optimization when the number of sequences being 
evaluated becomes very large. The NL optimization model and DFT models are 
unable to distinguish idealized patterns from random data. 
To better distinguish patterns from randomness, we develop a 
methodology, we call “test-two,” to fit observations outside of a test sample. If our 
sequence has N observations, we fit our models using the first N-2 inter-arrivals 
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and then we predict the N-1 and Nth inter-arrival. We calculate the RMSE using 
only the last two predicted observations. The results of our test-two methodology 
suggest there may be some potential to utilize NL optimization and DFT models 
to distinguish between random sequences of IEDs and patterns.  
We apply the NL optimization and DFT models using test-two 
methodology to a real-world Iraq dataset with a rolling horizon forecast. The 
dataset consists of all recorded, real-world Iraq IED events from January, 2005 to 
December 2008, over 80,000 IED events in total. We subset the Iraq data into 
eight, 6-month windows and filter the data spatially, which results in a total of 
1328 IED sequences to test. The rolling horizon forecast provides a quick way to 
compare the performance of our models against a naïve model that assumes all 
inter-arrivals are the mean as determined by the sample. For each subset, we 
produce a RMSE for all three models (DFT, NL optimization, naïve) for the first 
set of observations. We then step forward one observation and repeat the 
process; the second sequence differs from the first sequence by one 
observation. The naïve model out-performed the other models. This is not 
surprising since the naïve model blindly plows through all 1328 sequences, even 
though actual patterns are rare and most of the 1328 sequences do not 
constitute legitimate patterns. The DFT model performs better than the naïve 
approximately one-third of the time. The NL optimization model performs 
similarly. Applying the DFT and NL optimization across all sequences in a brute 
force manner is not effective: we generate better aggregate results by using the 
naïve inter-arrival. Rather than apply our methods across all sequences, we then 
applied our models to sequences in the Iraq dataset visually identified as 
patterns. 
Using the same 1328 IED sequences, we visually inspect each sequence 
manually and find 19 pattern candidate sequences that would warrant future 
targeting. Of the 19 candidate patterns, we find that the naïve model never 
performs the best and that the NL optimization and DFT model perform better 
than the mean approximately 85 percent of the time. For this particular subset of 
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data, the results suggest that an analyst could use the NL optimization model to 
filter down the number of sequences requiring visual inspection. Specifically, the 
filter reduces the number of sequences to inspect from 1328 to 440 and this 
smaller subset contains 90 percent of the visually identified patterns. 
We conclude that although there is not a “silver bullet” to IED pattern 
detection, making these models available to IED analysts has the potential to 
greatly reduce the amount of time and effort intelligence analysts expended to 
identify IED patterns. We recommend incorporating these models into a graphic 
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Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) originated in the 1500s in the form of 
ships laden with explosive materials (Singer 2012). The term “IED” today is 
synonymous with fixed explosives detonated remotely, such as those used 
against U.S. military vehicles and personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. IEDs are 
the weapon of choice for insurgencies due to their low cost, minimal risk to 
insurgents, and their effectiveness against their intended targets. At their peak, 
insurgents emplaced over 2,700 IEDs a month in Iraq alone (Atkinson 2007) 
resulting in significant U.S., Coalition and civilian casualties. IEDs became the 
weapon of choice in both Iraq and Afghanistan even though there were 
significant differences in targets chosen, explosives used, and emplacement 
methods between the two countries. Insurgents found an effective, asymmetric 
way to inflict great pain on a vastly superior conventional force using a few 
munitions and a detonator held together with electrical tape.  
IEDs have caused over half of all U.S. casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Zoroya 2013), making IEDs the single most effective weapon system employed 
by the insurgents. This has prompted the United States and its allies to spend 
over $75 billion on new vehicles, armor, and other detection/defeat technologies 
(Zoroya 2013). At an average cost of $265 USD per IED (Ackerman 2011), IEDs 
have proved to be extremely cost effective. As the U.S. and its allies look toward 
potential future conflicts, there is a consensus that enemies will employ IEDs in 
the future given their success in Iraq and Afghanistan. A report written by the 
Action on Armed Violence shows a nearly 70 percent increase in civilian 
casualties due to IEDs from 2011 to 2013 (AOAV 2013). IED reports in that study 
span 66 countries and are not exclusive to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. IED 
statistics suggest that IEDs will remain a weapon of choice to combat superior 
military force, and terrorize civilian populations. The objective of this thesis is to 
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improve tactical level targeting of the IEDs by developing models to assist 
intelligence analysts conducting IED pattern recognition. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Part of the response to IEDs included the development of entire 
organizations dedicated to the problem. On February 14, 2006, the Joint IED 
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) was established under DoD directive (JIDA 2015). 
As the lead agency in combating the IED threat, JIEDDO (now known as the 
Joint Improvised-Defeat Agency or JIDA) developed a strategy that includes 
Attack the Network and Defeat the Device (JIDA 2015). Attack the Network 
consists of tactical to operational level targeting of the network of individuals 
connected to the production, distribution, and emplacement of IEDs. These 
individuals include, but are not limited to, financiers, bomb-makers, and cell 
leaders. There is a generalized belief that if a node can be neutralized high 
enough in the network, the effects will trickle down with the potential to prevent 
multiple IED emplacements. Defeat the Device consists of developing 
technologies to detect and defend against individual IED attacks. Although JIDA 
developed and produced techniques and equipment for the entire force, it heavily 
focused on Route Clearance Teams (RCTs).  
RCTs were typically composed of Army Engineers using specialized 
equipment to detect and disable IEDs along main supply routes (MSRs) and 
alternate supply routes (ASRs). The primary objective of RCTs was the 
interdiction of the device before it could be detonated against a target. Once an 
RCT discovered an IED, the team’s use of robots and articulating arms mounted 
on vehicles allowed the interrogation of suspicious sites with limited exposure to 
individuals. RCTs were also better equipped and armored to potentially survive 
an IED detonation than their conventional or logistical force counterparts. JIDA 
developed, tested, and sourced many of these technologies. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the presence of Route Clearance had no significant impact on the 
number of IEDs emplaced by insurgents; however, RCTs did prove effective in 
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terms of higher discovery rates and lower casualties than maneuver or logistic 
forces. This is in part due to specialized equipment, which allowed distanced 
interrogation of possible IEDs, and perhaps more importantly, to the repetitive 
nature of Route Clearance. Route Clearance Soldiers would typically perform 
one eight- to 12-hour mission per day, six days a week, with one day for 
maintenance and recovery. During these missions, the same routes were 
consistently cleared, which allowed the development of an intense familiarity with 
the environment, enabling detection of small changes possibly indicating recent 
suspicious human activity. 
In support of RCTs, Military Intelligence Soldiers provided analysis to 
maximize the IED involvement of the RCTs. In my experience, most of this 
analysis was rather unsophisticated. The analysts created a named area of 
interest (NAI) around a region with a higher preponderance of IED events (Figure 
1). The analysts rarely updated the spatial boundaries of the NAIs (e.g., once 
every three to six months) because of difficulties in sharing changes between all 
interested units. Additionally, the analysis of the IED events within a single NAI 
tended to focus on summary statistics. In most cases, the analysis would inform 
the decision maker about the most likely time of day, initiation types, 
discovery/detonation rates, types of targets, etc. based on the historical events of 
the past week or month (Figure 2). This type of analysis was not unique to Route 
Clearance units, however, as logistics units were also very concerned about IED 
threats on supply routes. Even Intelligence Analysts supporting maneuver forces 
briefed their patrols on likely locations and times for IEDs prior to every mission 
and would use similar summary statistics to describe the IED environment. 
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Analysts would capture the spatial boundaries of high activity using NAIs and 
would use those boundaries as the basis for statistical analysis. 
Figure 1.  Example of a Named Area of Interest (NAI).  
 
Replicated analysis highlighting the statistical history of a particular NAI. 
Graphics like these would inform a commander about likely IED event times, 
types of initiation, and the discovery vs. detonation rate for that area. 
Figure 2.  Traditional Statistical Analysis by NAI. 
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Presentations of summary statistics became the standard in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. As a deployed intelligence analyst, I found this type of basic 
analysis adequate to describe past IED activity, but it suffered from numerous 
flaws. The environment was described on a sliding scale of probability (higher 
probability of IED activity from this time to this time in this location). This was 
informative to planners who were creating base route clearance schedules, but it 
failed to provide accurate predictions about specific locations and times for future 
events that would prompt an allocation of surveillance or clearance assets. 
Another issue with this type of analysis was the use of NAIs to spatially subset 
IED activity. Although the intended purpose of using NAIs was to focus analysis 
on areas of high IED activity, they became a visual obstacle preventing 
intelligence analysts from exploring the influence of external IED activity. Military 
Intelligence Soldiers supporting route clearance and logistics units defined 
success as being able to identify specific IED patterns to “predict” future events. 
Usually, summary statistics based on NAIs did not provide the necessary 
information to meet this need. 
In my experience, intelligence analysts saw the most success when they 
analyzed the time between IED events for a given geographic area rather than 
focusing singularly on event time of day. On rare occasions, they could even 
identify patterns in the inter-arrival times that could be exploit to predict future 
IED events or series of events. Analysts found that, on occasion, enemy activity 
naturally fell into an identifiable pattern, which was sometimes based on or 
influenced by IED supply cycles, insurgent daily life, or patterns set by U.S. 
forces. Regrettably, this type of analysis was painstaking; an analyst would 
manually evaluate potentially hundreds of IED sequences searching for patterns. 
Analysis becomes even more complicated when one considers the possibility of 
patterns only existing based on categorical variables such as initiation type.  
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C. SCOPE 
Proper employment of route clearance assets in space and time requires 
military planners to consider basing, routes to patrol, and patrol times that 
maximize IED involvement rates. These three topics have been researched 
thoroughly over the past decade, but a gap still exists for efficiently recognizing 
patterns given previous IED activity in well-defined space. Successful IED pattern 
recognition would prompt a decision to alter a patrol schedule or request a 
surveillance asset in order to interdict the emplacement of the next device 
I spent 24 months facing this problem without discovering an efficient 
method to evaluate potential patterns. This thesis provides a more rigorous 
methodology for IED intelligence analysis that streamlines the processes and 
provides better results faster than current manual approaches. We evaluate 
various mathematical methods to determine the predictability of IED sequences 
given a defined geographic area. We assume that the spatial boundaries will be 
selected by the intelligence analyst each time this analysis is performed; we 
focus on temporal pattern identification using time between IED events as the 
only model input. This thesis will not take into account external factors that often 
disrupt IED patterns such as the death or capture of insurgent leaders or the 
departure of Coalition forces from a particular area. Rather, it will focus on 
identifying possible patterns for future exploitation by U.S. and coalition forces.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Numerous researchers have developed mathematical models to examine 
IED activity. These models include stochastic Markov chains, game theory, and 
point processes. In fact, JIDA employs a team called the Crime Pattern Analysis 
Team (CPAT), which consists of mathematicians and law enforcement experts 
who are responsible for developing and implementing predictive IED models 
(Shankar 2014). Those tools provide predictive IED analysis to deployed 
commanders. Unfortunately, CPAT is limited by its small size, which limits the 
amount of information and data it can process at any given time. CPAT products 
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are also often enhanced by biometrics obtained during exploitation of an IED 
event. This again adds robustness to its analysis but at the cost of time. These 
limitations force the CPAT to concentrate on requests from deployed units on a 
first come, first served basis. CPAT has neither the capability to recommend 
route clearance schedules to all commanders across a theatre nor the capability 
to recommend a geographic target for an ad hoc surveillance asset transiting 
battlespace. The methodologies we propose would not only assist intelligence 
officers supporting deployed units, but have the potential to assist subject matter 
experts like those at CPAT by quickly identifying potential patterns for further 
analysis. 
Rather than attempting to identify IED patterns, one analytic approach is 
to optimize route clearance scheduling based on probability modeling. This 
method was explored extensively by LTC Christopher Marks in 2009. Using an 
effectiveness parameter and modeling IED arrivals as a Poisson process, Marks’ 
algorithm allows the user to define IED risk along a section of a route (Marks 
2009). Route Clearance response to that risk is then optimized using mixed 
integer linear programming with the route network and availability of RCTs as 
constraints. Marks highlights that possible future work in this field could include 
more in-depth modeling of enemy activity to more accurately feed his route 
clearance optimization (Marks 2009). He specifically suggests the possible use of 
game theory models, such as those developed by Alan Washburn, as potential 
methods to add robustness to enemy modeling (Washburn, 2006). 
Similar work by Professor Robert Koyak from the Naval Postgraduate 
School determines the probability of encountering an IED along a particular 
stretch of road based on not only previous activity but also friendly force traffic 
patterns (Koyak 2009). Koyak begins with the assumption that IED encounters 
occur no later than the next passing friendly convoy, which allows him to assert 
that the emplacement of that IED occurred sometime after the last friendly 
presence along that particular stretch of road. Using this idea as a framework, he 
extends the model to allow for specific enemy targeting and the possibility of IED 
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discovery if the convoy is not the intended target (Koyak 2009). His work in 
conjunction with the route clearance optimization developed by Marks could be 
developed into a powerful tool for developing a base route clearance schedule. 
However, a gap still remains as neither method identifies IED patterns that would 
lead an intelligence analyst to recommend a change in schedule or request 
surveillance of a specific location at a specific time. 
Matthew Bengini and Reinhard Furrer worked jointly on an IED prediction 
method that used spatial and temporal clustering in an attempt to optimize 
surveillance loiter time and location (Bengini et al. 2012). They created an 
intensity function based on IED event time of day and distance away from a 
known origin, which then can be transformed into a contour map of probability 
densities. The optimal assignment of surveillance assets is then calculated based 
on maximizing the integral of probabilities for a given length of time and width of 
search range. They discovered that this method enjoyed some success only in 
the short term. However, this methodology was developed to inform a planner 
constructing a base surveillance schedule and it does not identify specific 
patterns based on time between events (Bengini et al. 2012). 
The most recent academic work on IED activity was conducted in 2014. 
MAJ Arun Shankar produced a dissertation attempting to model IED activity, 
specifically in Afghanistan against dismounted patrols (Shankar 2014). This 
problem set is uniquely different from IED activity against mounted patrols due to 
the possibility of movement that deviates from an established route or road 
network. The ability to move in two-dimensional space as opposed to a one-
dimensional road (forward or backward) creates an environment where there is a 
much greater probability that emplaced IEDs were missed by passing troops. 
Through his work, Shankar developed three different models to describe and 
predict future IED activity. He evaluated IED activity temporally and rejected the 
hypothesis that IED activity targeting dismounted patrols can be described by a 
non-homogenous Poisson process (NHPP). He developed a spatial clustering 
model that simulates future IED events using historical data. Lastly, he focused 
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on modeling emplacement time rather than IED discovery or detonation times 
using overlapping patrol zones and probabilities of each patrol encountering a 
single IED. He found that although the IED events could not be described as 
NHPP, their emplacement could. He points out that NHPPs rely on large 
datasets to be validated which help inform operational commanders about 
upward or downward IED trends across an entire theatre (Shankar 2014). 
Shankar’s work, like so many other models of IED activity, has not resulted in a 
tangible tool or method usable by IED analysts.  
Given the periodic and spatial nature of IED activity, a similar field that has 
received attention from analysts is crime patterning. Crime analysis is a long-
established practice; however, it was not recognized as a profession and did not 
receive a name until the early 1970s (Stevenson 2013). One often-used method 
for forecasting future crime patterns is time series analysis. Time series analysis 
is especially useful when attempting to predict patterns with seasonality using 
occurrences of previous events to build a prediction of the future. These types of 
models are often referred to as Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average 
(ARIMA) and have successfully been used to model crime. Esra Polat created 
one such model by clustering crime activity spatially and applying the Box-
Jenkins ARIMA model (Polat 2007). One significant disadvantage to time series 
analysis is the need for large data due to the need to capture seasonality. Polat’s 
model attempted to predict activity on a daily basis over the course of a year, and 
he therefore required three years of data to sufficiently describe seasonality 
(Polat 2007). Anecdotal evidence suggests that IED pattern recognition is most 
effective when IED data is filtered to a very local level, both spatially and 
temporally, which results in very sparse data unsuited for the modeling 
techniques suggested by Polat. 
Crime patterning is also explained using various self-exciting point 
process (Mohler et al. 2012). While a traditional point process has a single arrival 
rate, a self-exciting point process is defined by a variable arrival rate triggered by 
additional arrivals into a system. A classic application a self-exciting point 
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process model is seismic activity where one earthquake can trigger multiple 
aftershocks (Ogata 2012). Mohler cites several examples where a self-exciting 
point process would be appropriate to model arrival behavior. Those examples 
include gang violence where a single gang shooting triggers retaliatory violence 
and home robberies where burglars often case several houses in a neighborhood 
before attempting their first robbery and subsequent robberies happen in quick 
succession. The authors use large datasets to explore the self-exciting point 
process as a model of crime. It is possible that cyclical IED patterns can be 
described by a similar process when re-supply cycles are contributing factors to 
IED arrival rates at a local level.  
In 1999, Dan Helms wrote a technical report entitled “The Use of Dynamic 
Spatio-Temporal Analytic Techniques to Resolve Emergent Crime Series” 
(Helms 1999). In this report, Helms details various techniques to predict and 
interrupt crime patterns. One method he details is the use of hydrology mapping 
to describe the temporal nature of crime. It consists of mapping activity with day 
of week as one axis and time of day as another. Each crime represents added 
weight, creating hydrology contours which could then be used to refine 
predictions of future events. 
Another method described by Helms was the use of Discrete Fourier 
Transforms for pattern recognition. Using the most influential harmonics from 
spectral analysis, an analyst can estimate the periodicity and therefore develop a 
prediction for future events based on time between crimes (Helms 1999). This 
particular method shows promise for modeling IED activity since localized 
patterns are often cyclical in nature. This is most likely the result of either an IED 
supply cycle constraining the number of IEDs that can be emplaced at any given 
time or caused by the cyclic presence of coalition forces in the area. Fourier 
Transforms are therefore of particular interest in this thesis and will be explored 
in much greater detail in subsequent chapters.  
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E. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The remainder of this thesis is organized into four additional chapters. 
Chapter II describes the two sources of data available for this thesis as well as 
highlights patterns based on time between IED events. The following chapter will 
test three different methods for pattern prediction against known patterns: 
Hawkes point process, non-linear optimization of sinusoidal functions, and 
discrete Fourier transforms. Chapter IV will explore the methodology of using a 
test set to confirm model results as well as performing rolling predictions on IED 
events in Iraq. The last chapter will provide a summary of the thesis findings and 
potential future work.  
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II. DATA COLLECTION AND FILTERING 
This chapter will provide an overview of the two data sources used to build 
and test our models. We provide the summary statistics for each and explore IED 
emplacements as a Poisson process. We then describe the types of IED patterns 
common in Iraq and Afghanistan. We also discuss methodologies for data 
filtering since we want to identify IED patterns at a local level. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion about the necessary requirements to distinguish 
patterns from random data. 
A. DATA 
This thesis focuses on two data sources. The primary data source 
consists of all real-world IED events in Iraq from January, 2005 to December 
2008 and is used to explore model performance against a realistic IED 
environment. The second data source is a notional dataset built with known 
patterns, which is used for model development, and testing. 
1. Iraq Data 
The U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan made significant efforts to 
capture as much information as possible about IED attacks. These significant 
activities (SIGACTS) were shared among units through various interlinked 
databases. The most prominent and widely used database was the Combined 
Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), which is maintained to this day by 
Central Command (CENTCOM) (CIDNE 2016). IEDs were considered SIGACTs 
and as such, the information collected at the scene of each IED resides within 
the CIDNE database. CIDNE also maintains the basic information about each 
event such as the date, time, and location, which are the three necessary fields 
used in this thesis. A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to CENTCOM 
resulted in the acquisition of a subset of Iraq IED data.  
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The CIDNE database obtained from CENTCOM consists of date, time, 
location, and whether the device was detonated against its target or discovered 
before successful detonation. The data consists of every IED in Iraq from 
January, 2005 through December, 2008. There are ~49,700 detonations and 
~32,100 discoveries totaling nearly 82,000 IED events during this four-year time 
period. Figure 3 is a map of IED activity during the month of September 2006, 
which was the most active IED month ever recorded in Iraq with 2768 IED 
events. The spatial representation of activity in this month mirrors that of other 
months with heavy concentrations of IEDs in urban areas such as Baghdad in 
Central Iraq and Mosul in Northern Iraq. IED activity outside of urban clusters 
follow linear paths which are the routes most often trafficked by coalition forces.  
 
Heavy concentrations of IEDs in urban areas such as Baghdad (Central) and 
Mosul (North) with the remainder of activity focused along major and minor 
supply routes. Insert used to highlight how IED activity is spatially related to road 
networks. 
Figure 3.  September 2006 IED Activity in Iraq. 
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IED counts over 2005–2008 also prove to be indicative of the strength of 
the insurgency. From early 2005 until mid-2007 there is an increasing trend in the 
number of IED events and a corresponding growth in insurgency strength leading 
up to the surge. At the end of 2007, a period known as the “Sunni Awakening” or 
“Sons of Iraq” resulted in a significant decrease in SIGACT activity, specifically in 
central and northern Iraq, which can clearly be seen in Figure 4 (Wilbanks et al. 
2010). The effect of the Sunni Awakening is clearly evident when this data is 
analyzed. There were a total of 16,256 IED events in the last 14 months of this 
dataset and a total of 32,323 events in the preceding 14-month period, a drop of 
nearly 50 percent. This drop in IED activity presents challenges to modeling IED 
patterns as IED activity is not stationary over this four-year horizon.  
 
Figure 4.  IED Detonations and Discoveries in Iraq from 2005–2008. 
Lack of stationarity suggests that modeling IED activity as a homogenous 
Poisson process over this four-year period and across the extent of Iraq would 
not be appropriate. The mean number of IEDs per month across the entire 
dataset is ~1704 while the variance is a little over 354,000. If IED activity across 
the entire country and time period were well represented by a Poisson process, 
these two values would be nearly equal. This evidence against the homogenous 
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Poisson process is strengthened when one calculates inter-arrival time across 
the entire dataset. The mean inter-arrival time is 0.43 hours while the standard 
deviation is 0.697 across all 81,824 IED events. The fact that these two values 
differ by a reasonable margin for a fairly large dataset suggests that inter-arrivals 
do not come from an exponential distribution and therefore cannot be modeled 
with a Poisson Process.  
Non-conformity to a Poisson process is further evidenced when the real-
world dataset is filtered temporally and spatially, focusing on specific areas over 
shorter periods of time. For example, if we focus on the height of the insurgency 
between August 06 and July 07, IED activity looks relatively stationary (Figure 4), 
with a range of 2105 to 2768 IEDs per month. The mean number of IEDs per 
month was 2493 with a variance of 39,498. The inter-arrival mean was 0.292 with 
a standard deviation of 0.423. We also explored the possibility of IED activity 
supporting a Poisson process by spatially filtering the data around Baghdad 
proper during the height of the insurgency, and the analysis produced similar 
results. These results do not suggest that a Poisson process is a poor model for 
every possible spatio-temporal IED subset, but it does suggest that one should 
proceed with caution utilizing a Poisson process without furthering examining the 
specific data of interest. 
2. Notional Data 
The second dataset we explore is a notional IED database consisting of 
106 IED events over a 31-day period. This dataset was created before work on 
this thesis began based on experiences in Iraq using known patterns reminiscent 
of those encountered when deployed. The IEDs in this dataset stretch across 
approximately 250 km of roadway with five named areas of interest (NAIs) drawn 
around high concentrations of IED activity (Figure 5). The spatial placement of 
NAIs in this notional environment is consistent with methods used in Iraq, which 
suggests that their placement is likely based on IED activity from over three  
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months ago. This reinforces the idea that spatially stagnant NAIs may not be the 
best method to spatially filter IED activity. The notional discovery versus 
detonation rate (percentage of IEDs discovered before successful detonation) is 
approximately 40 percent (Figure 6), which mirrors the rate seen in Iraq during 
the height of the insurgency from 2005–2007 as calculated from the real-world 
dataset described in the previous subsection.  
 




Figure 6.  Detonations and Discoveries by Day from the Notional Dataset. 
Table 1 and Figures 7–8 represent the data input and statistical output 
normally produced when analyzing IED activity for a single NAI. These were 
produced from the notional dataset and the primary inputs for traditional 
statistical analysis are time, location, and initiation type. Information about time 
and location provide the base upon which a route clearance schedule is 
developed, while initiation type allows a commander to allocate her counter-IED 
equipment according to the type of threat. This dataset is not based on real-world 
events. The notional dataset is primarily used to develop and test various 
prediction methodologies against known patterns while the real-world dataset is 









Table 1.   Notional IED Events in NAI Rhino. 
 
IED database filtered to include NAI Rhino IED events. Database includes the 
type of event (detonation vs. discovery), the main supply route (MSR)/alternate 
supply route (ASR) on which the event took place, and the type of initiation 
method used by insurgents. 
 
Figure 7.  Spatial Representation of IED Events in NAI Rhino. 
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Time analysis suggests the existence of two primary attack times (0300–0600 
and 1300–1700) while initiation type suggest two primary initiation types. This 
bimodal behavior should prompt a military intelligence analyst to break down 
events by time of day and initiation type to see if a spatial, temporal, and/or 
initiation relationship exists. 
Figure 8.  Traditional Statistical Output of IED Events in NAI Rhino.  
B. PATTERNS 
Experience suggests that predictable IED patterns are most often present 
at a local level, both spatially and temporally. A simple example of an IED pattern 
is the appearance of an IED every other night for two weeks over a 5km stretch 
of road. It is very unlikely that patterns exist across more than 25 km of a road 
network or exceed two months of time. This spatial limit is based on insurgent 
coordination resulting in the physical separation of IED cells in rural areas as well 
an IED emplacer’s potential unwillingness to travel long distances to conduct 
attacks. The temporal limit is based on the increased probability of pattern 
disruption as time passes. Potential IED pattern disruptions include the removal 
of coalition force presence or the death or capture of an IED cell member. These 
limitations require us to analyze sparse data (usually no more than 25 events) for 
pattern recognition. There is a greater chance to identify IED patterns and, 
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therefore, the next IED event, by relying only on the most recent activity in a 
given area.  
1. Pattern Visualization 
Deployed analysts developed a particular pattern visualization technique 
that allowed quick identification of the existence of a pattern given a sequence of 
IEDs. As an example of this technique, we construct Figure 9 from the notional 
dataset by filtering the data spatially to one particular NAI and temporally to the 
current month; this filtering results in a total of 11 events. Once we filter the data, 
the events are ordered sequentially and we compute the inter-arrival times as 
shown in the last column of Figure 9. We then plot the inter-arrival times using a 
scatter plot, with a smoother for quick visualization (Figure 10). The x axis 
represents the sequence index (1,2,3, . . .) and the y axis is the calculated inter-
arrival time. Common patterns include a relatively flat line or cyclical oscillations.  
 
Figure 9.  Spatio-Temporal Subset with Inter-Arrival Calculations. 
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Figure 10.  Time between Events Visualization Example. 
2. Common Patterns 
Identifiable IED patterns exist in two broad forms often based upon 
insurgent availability of funding, materials, and labor necessary for IED 
production. The first is common in areas with a near endless supply of IEDs and 
is the easiest to recognize. It is categorized by approximately constant inter-
arrival times with low variability. Examples of this type of pattern are an IED 
every 22 to 26 hours for five days in a row or an IED every eight to 10 hours 
targeting a constant flow of logistical patrols. It is rare to see these patterns 
continue past six IEDs. Just as intelligence analysts are trying to identify 
patterns, insurgent elements want to avoid falling into easily identifiable patterns, 
and hence will often vary their emplacement times and locations. Using the 
visualization technique described in the previous section, this type of pattern 
would appear as a near flat line and prediction of the next event would be 
calculated using the mean inter-arrival time (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11.  Near Endless Supply Pattern Visualization 
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The second and more common pattern is heavily influenced by supply and 
coalition force operations, and is therefore more cyclic in nature. These types of 
patterns may be less obvious to the insurgents conducting the attacks. This 
results in patterns involving many more IEDs than the patterns in the near 
endless supply scenarios previously described. However, these types of patterns 
are also more difficult for analysts to detect. Cyclical patterns can be further 
broken down into three categories: large supply, short supply, and steady supply. 
The exact form of the patterns differs significantly. Patterns emerging in large 
supply situations have multiple events in quick succession followed by a short lull 
in activity during resupply (Figure 12). Large supply cycles often occur spatially in 
IED hotspots. It is possible that these large supply cycles are the result of one 
IED supplier providing product to multiple individuals emplacing IEDs. The short 
supply scenario is the opposite with large amounts of time between most IED 
activity until a larger than normal supply becomes available (Figure 13). These 
patterns often appear in areas with lower levels of IED activity and are most likely 
the result of only one IED emplacer. Steady supply is the most predictable of 
these three cyclic patterns and most resembles a standard sinusoidal curve. 
These patterns typically have one to two events in short succession followed by a 
lull in activity as insurgents spread out the emplacement of their remaining IEDs 
while waiting for resupply (Figure 14). This is also the most common of the 
described predictable patterns and these patterns appear in both high and low 
density areas. 
 
Figure 12.  Large Supply Pattern Visualization. 
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Figure 13.  Short Supply Pattern Visualization. 
 
Figure 14.  Steady Supply Pattern Visualization. 
C. DATA FILTERING 
When attempting to identify a specific pattern or signature based on time 
between IED events, it is important to spatially filter the data to a local level. NAIs 
would often be the basis for filtering even though they were rarely altered or 
reviewed. Other methods include using a bounding box described by an upper 
left and lower right geographic reference or hotspot analysis where the analyst 
begins their search in areas with the highest concentration of IEDs and gradually 
moves outward from the center of those clusters. This thesis will focus on the 
identification of temporal patterns once an analyst has already filtered the data 
spatially, leaving the criteria of the spatial filter up to the intelligence analyst 
(Figure 15). This allows the analyst to focus on spatial pattern identification 
efforts in the broader context of personal knowledge and experience with the 
surrounding environment. It is the responsibility of the intelligence analyst to 
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coalesce unquantifiable data into predictions of future enemy activity. An 
example of unquantifiable data in this context may be a key leader discussion 
with a local tribal leader who promises to address those in his tribe conducting 
attacks against U.S. forces. An engagement of this kind has the potential to 
disrupt or alter current IED activity in a given area. Allowing analysts to determine 
the spatial boundaries of their analysis gives them the necessary flexibility to 
analyze IED activity that is of concern to them and their leadership. 
 
IED activity is filtered spatially as determined by the analyst. In this case, the 
analyst is concerned with IED activity along this particular stretch of HWY 1 due 
to the high casualty rate and they believe a pattern may exist since there is no 
reporting to suggest a disruption of IED activity in this area. This is a spatial 
representation of 2005 data over a 7km stretch of road (IED activity taken from 
Iraq dataset) 
Figure 15.  IED Spatial Filtering 
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Once the analyst filters the IED data spatially, it needs to be filtered 
temporally. Traditional military IED analysis tends to do this on a weekly or 
monthly basis since the counter-IED working groups met on a weekly or monthly 
basis. This approach is limited as it simply discards data based on date 
regardless of localized trends and patterns. It is likely to miss a slow developing 
pattern or overlook fast developing patterns because data selection is based on 
specific dates rather than localized trends. A better method would focus on the 
number of IED events for the spatial area previously identified by the analyst. 
Tactical IED pattern analysis is best performed when there are between six and 
25 events. A discernable pattern lasting more than 25 events is unlikely, because 
the process underlying the pattern is likely to be disrupted, while anything less 
than six events is not enough data to make reasonable predictions. We 
recommend analysts should start with the last event in a localized area and 
backtrack to include no more than 25 events (Figure 16). This thesis will focus on 
patterns defined by these quantity boundaries. 
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It is assumed for this example that the analysis is taking place on December 31, 
2005. The analyst has already spatially filtered the area according to historic 
activity and now temporally filters the area by including the last 25 IED events, 
which reduces the number of IED events to be analyze. At this point, the analyst 
may decide to do another spatial filter if, for example, they notice that recent 
activity is focused in the southern portion of their original spatial filter. The data is 
now spatially and temporally filtered for pattern prediction. 
Figure 16.  IED Temporal Filtering. 
The spatio-temporal filtering requires that we evaluate patterns at a very 
local level over a relatively short amount of time. Localized analysis is crucial to 
the prediction of specific locations and times of future events. Once data 
evaluation begins to exceed 40km of roadway or three months of data, an 
analyst is no longer attempting identify specific patterns but rather evaluating 
long-term risk along his assigned routes. Increasing the scope even wider to 
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activity over a year across a very large space then starts to feed the operational 
picture in terms of violence levels and whether coalition efforts are having the 
desired effect across the country. It is important to note that this thesis is limited 
to a very local level with the assumption that the individual unit hunting, or 
attempting to avoid the next IED, has very little ability to directly influence the 
operational campaign.  
D. EXAMINATION OF FILTERED DATA 
The results of the aforementioned spatio-temporal filtering will be an IED 
subset consisting of the most recent IED events (not to exceed 25) for a given 
area. If an IED pattern exists within that subset, it is likely that it will not be 
comprised of all events. A given subset of IED events will usually contain some 
“noise” events. In a deployed situation, IED noise may be generated by a newly 
arrived insurgent cell emplacing IEDs, a lack of coalition force presence for an 
unusual amount of time, or by an uncharacteristic IED supply change. It is also 
possible for multiple IED cells to operate in the same area without coordination. 
This occurs most often in urban environments. While the activity driven by each 
cell may produce a viable pattern, the combined activity across all cells may not. 
For our purposes, we define IED noise as IED events that fall within the 
temporal-spatial boundaries of interest, but do not contribute to a distinguishable 
pattern. These types of events may represent a temporary deviation from the 
traditional pattern in the area but do not necessarily suggest a complete 
disruption of that same pattern. It is then important to account for the possibility 
of IED noise in the final filtered dataset when developing pattern models. 
The most straightforward method to determine whether a pattern exists 
within a larger collection of IED events is to iterate through every possible subset 
of the filtered IED data and evaluate whether each subset constitutes a pattern. 
This process, however, requires significant computing power since a filtered 
dataset containing between six and 25 IEDs results in over 33 million possible 
IED combinations. Depending upon the computational effort required to fit a 
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model, it may be infeasible to consider such a large number of subsets. 
Furthermore, differentiating between predictable IED patterns and random or 
unassociated IED events among so many combinations becomes a significant 
hurdle because of false alarms. The sheer number of subsets ensures that a 
model will likely specify that multiple subsets constitute a legitimate pattern, when 
in fact no actual underlying pattern exists.  
Evaluating millions of possible IED combinations is outside the scope of 
this thesis; we suggest two simple rules to reduce the number of subsets for 
consideration. First is the removal of the last two events from the filtered data 
and setting them aside for model testing. In a filtered dataset with 22 inter-
arrivals, we remove and set aside observations 21 and 22 while observations 
one to 20 would be used to develop the model and estimate appropriate 
parameters (Table 2). The resulting model can then be used to predict 
observations 21 and 22. Model performance can then be measured by the 
difference between the model’s predictions and the reality of observations 21 and 
22. Testing against the last two inter-arrivals is consistent with techniques used 
in a deployed environment. An intelligence analyst would never suggest a 
change in patrol schedule or request surveillance assets in a situation where a 
possible pattern was identified even though the last two IED events deviated 
significantly from model predictions. This is not to suggest that the analyst would 
instantly dismiss the potential pattern but either the pattern should have already 
been identified through previous analysis or the analyst would want to confirm 
the patterns continuance at a future date before allocating limited resources. The 
first rule alone reduces the maximum number of possible combinations to just 





Table 2.   Examining Filtered Data. 
 
Continuing from Figure 16, this is the data subset selected for pattern prediction. 
The last two events (21 and 22) will be used for model testing while model 
development must include at least 15 of the remaining 20 events to be 
considered viable. 
The second rule simply suggests the inclusion of a certain percentage of 
the filtered data when attempting to find patterns. This prevents a situation where 
very few IEDs of the original dataset coincidently generate a pattern. Instead, it 
forces the inclusion of a majority of IED activity in a given area for pattern 
distinction. At least 70 percent of IED events should be included in a given spatial 
and temporal subset to constitute a viable pattern. This would require potential 
subsets of the original 22 inter-arrivals to include at least 15 of those 
observations during the modeling process (see Table 2 for an example). This 
requirement for pattern recognition is reasonable in an operational environment 
without additional explanatory variables such as initiation types or biometrics, 
which have the potential to drive pattern analysis. This second step further 
reduces the number of possible combinations from just over eight million to a 
very manageable one hundred forty-six thousand.  
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There are many considerations intelligence analysts must take into 
account when filtering data for analysis. The remainder of this thesis will assume 
the analyst has subset the data with these considerations in mind and will focus 
on the development and testing of mathematical models to predict future IED 
activity given the data identified by an analyst. The next chapter describes each 
model in depth and provides a performance summary.  
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will focus on the evaluation of various mathematical 
methodologies to accurately model cyclical IED patterns. It will start by 
presenting the data we use to evaluate each methodology and then transition 
into a discussion about the methods we will consider. We will examine the 
Hawkes point process, Non-linear (NL) optimization of a sine function, and 
discrete Fourier transforms (DFT). For each methodology, we will briefly describe 
why we chose it, provide a detailed explanation of the mathematical process, and 
summarize the results of testing against known patterns. 
B. DATA FOR TESTING 
We first generated a dataset to test our methodologies. Rather than 
mining our data for ideal test patterns, we generate data that produced cyclical 
patterns similar to those described in Chapter II. This ensures that we can test 
our methodologies against every type of pattern (steady supply, high supply, and 
low supply), and that each pattern will consist of the same number of IED events. 
We chose to generate 15 events (producing 14 inter-arrivals) per pattern as the 
baseline for testing. We chose this number to balance between too few events, 
which could potentially be explained by coincidence, and too many events, which 
would increase the likelihood of pattern disruption. Generating our own patterns 
also allows us to control the presence of IED noise. For testing purposes, we did 
not include IED noise because we want to compare the performance of 
methodologies against one another in an ideal environment.  
We first generated the data representing the steady supply pattern. This 
pattern consists of a sequence of “long” inter-arrival times, followed by a 
sequence of “short” inter-arrival times, followed by a sequence of “long” inter-
arrival times, etc. We generated the short inter-arrival times using a uniform 
distribution between 20 and 30 hours, and we generated the long inter-arrival 
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times using a uniform distribution between 115 and 125. Each sequence consists 
of either one or two events with equal probability. This process creates a pattern 
defined by the presence of one or two IED events in short succession (between 
20 and 30 hours) and one or two events in long succession (between 115 and 
125 hours). Table 3 and Figure 17 illustrate the test pattern created using the 
process as described. Table 3 contains both the inter-arrival time (column 3) and 
the time of event (column 2); we use an arbitrary start date and time of 1/1/07 
0:01 to derive the time. The cyclical nature of the data is clearly seen through the 
resultant sinusoidal curve (Figure 17). The mean and standard deviation of the 
inter-arrival times appear in Table 1 as well. 
 

























Table 3.   Data–Steady Supply Pattern. 
 
 
We use a similar process to generate the patterns for high supply and low 
supply scenarios (Figures 18–19). Both require the use of one additional uniform 
distribution to differentiate between how many events occurred during the long 
inter-arrival period versus the short inter-arrival period. For the high supply 
pattern, the long inter-arrival periods consist of either one or two events while the 
short inter-arrival period contained either four or five events. This translates into 
four or five events occurring in quick succession (between 20 and 30 hours) with 
a resupply cycle represented by one or two events with long inter-arrivals 
(between 115 and 125). The reverse holds true for the low supply pattern. The 






Table 4.   Data–High Supply Pattern. 
 
 


























Table 5.   Data–Low Supply Pattern. 
 
 
Figure 19.  Visualization of Low Supply Pattern. 
We also generated a random series of 15 IED events with inter-arrival 
times uniformly distributed between 0 and 100 hours (Table 6 and Figure 20). We 
test the randomized series using the same methodologies to compare against 
the well-established patterns. The difference in model performance between the 
randomized data and known patterns is an indicator of how well a particular 



















Table 6.   Data–Random Sequence. 
 
 
Figure 20.  Visualization of Random Sequence. 
C. MEASURING MODEL PERFORMANCE 
We primarily measure model performance using root-mean-squared error 
(RMSE). The formulation of RMSE appears in Equation 1, where n represents 

















yi represents the recorded inter-arrival times in hours, and y i represents the 
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We will also plot the fitted values y i on the same plot as the actual inter-arrival 
times yi to visually inspect the model fit. RMSE provides a mathematical 
approach to compare models and IED sequences; however, it does not capture 
where along a sequence the model performs well or poorly. Visual inspection 
during development and testing allows us to identify whether a large RMSE (poor 
model fit) is the result of a model’s inability to capture outlier values or the result 
of consistent errors even though the model captures the general shape of the 
pattern.  
D. HAWKES POINT PROCESS 
The first methodology we evaluate is the Hawkes point process. In the 
early 1970s, Alan Hawkes developed a theoretical model of a self-exciting point 
process (SEPP) (Hawkes 1971). A classic application of such a model is 
earthquakes triggering aftershocks (Ogata 2012). When applying SEPP to 
earthquake behavior, the likelihood of earthquakes occurring in the near future 
increases after an initial earthquake event. There have also been successful 
attempts to model crime patterns with Hawkes processes, where an initial crime 
triggers a flurry of additional crime (Mohler 2009). The same logic may apply to 
cyclical IED patterns. For example, in the high supply pattern scenario, an initial 
IED after a lull in activity is then followed by several more IEDs in quick 
succession. While the Hawkes dynamics may reasonably represent the high 
supply pattern, it may not do as well for other types of supply patterns. 
A traditional point process consists of a single arrival rate (or intensity 
function) given by Equation 2, where N(t) represents the number of IED events 
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As such, λ(t) is the instantaneous arrival rate of new events given the history  
of events. Another interpretation is that the conditional probability an event  
will occur in the next small time period h is roughly λ(t)*h (Toke 2011). A 
homogenous Poisson process has λ(t) = λ for all t and histories. 
Hawkes point process differs from a Poisson process in that an arrival at 
time s, increases the intensity function λ(t) for t > s. Each new arrival into a 
Hawkes point process triggers an increase in the intensity function, creating a 
situation where the current arrival rate is determined by previous activity (Hawkes 
1971). The specific intensity function we will consider appears in Equation 3 
(Toke 2011).  
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The parameter µ0 represents the baseline intensity; IEDs will arrive at rate µ0 if 
no other IEDs events have occurred for an extended period of time. Roughly 
speaking, if it has been a long time since the last IED event, then the time until 
the next IED event has an exponential distribution with rate µ0. The summation 
term in Equation 3 allows for an increase in the intensity function whenever a 
new IED event occurs. However, the impact of an IED event on the arrival rate of 
future IED events diminishes over time. The β parameter captures the decay rate 
of the arrival rate change, which is a measure of the duration of influence a new 
arrival has on the intensity function (larger β implies the influence is fleeting). The 
α term is a measurement of how influential a new arrival is to the system. Large α 
implies a new arrival will have an immediate and significant impact on the 
intensity function, which may trigger a cascade of future events. An α close to 
zero suggests that the process could be modeled adequately as a Poisson 
process (Toke 2011). 
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1. Description of the Methodology 
Given a set of data, we can estimate the three Hawkes parameters. To do 
so, we will take a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) approach. We adapted 
the log-likelihood function from (Toke 2011), which appears in Equations 4–5.  
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Equation 5 represents an intermediate value necessary to solve the negative log-
likelihood function (Equation 4). To estimate the three parameters µ0, α and β 
requires formulating a non-linear (NL) optimization problem to maximize the log-
likelihood function.  
We perform the MLE computations in the R programming language using 
the general optimization function from the stats package (Appendix A. Scripts). 
The inputs for the optimization function are initial parameter estimates for µ0, α 
and β, the negative log-likelihood function as an R function, and a vector of 
recorded arrival times. It is important to note that we use arrival times instead of 
inter-arrival times in the calculation of the likelihood function for the Hawkes 
process. The optimization routine returns the “optimal” estimates of µ0, α and β. 
As the optimization problem is non-linear the optimization routine may terminate 
before finding the global optimum. We re-run the optimization routine 1000 times 
with different initial estimates for µ0, α and β. We generate initial parameters from 
a random uniform distribution over 0 to 10, and we only keep the iteration that 
produces the smallest value of the negative log-likelihood. The only remaining 
constraint is forcing a non-negative α and β. 
After calculating estimates for µ0, α and β, we can evaluate the model 
performance by computing the RMSE. To do this, we perform a modified 
calculation of Equation 1. We first simulate a Hawkes process for the given 
values of µ0, α and β, which produces our estimated inter-arrival times y ij where i 
represents the event in sequence and j represents an individual simulation run. 
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We simulate a Hawkes process using the hawkes R package. We then compute 
RMSE using Equation 1 for this one simulated process after reconverting arrival 
times into inter-arrival times. We repeat this process 1000 times, computing 1000 
RMSEs, taking the average to arrive at our final measure of effectiveness for this 
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2. Model Performance 
The resulting RMSE from our testing appears in Table 7. We also plot the 
mean arrival time for each event (computed via simulation) against the actual 
data in Figure 21. Visual inspection shows that the Hawkes model fit defaults to a 
single mean arrival rate for the system. The Hawkes optimization assigns an 
optimal value of zero to α for all scenarios, which suggests that a traditional 
Poisson process fits better than a more complex Hawkes process. Just using the 
mean arrival rate will not capture the cyclic nature of most IED patterns, as 
illustrated in Figure 21. Visualization of Hawkes performance against low supply, 
steady supply and the random data can be found in Appendix B. Visualization of 
Model Results. 
Table 7.   RMSE Results and Parameters from Modeling IED Behavior 




Figure 21.  Model Fit by Hawkes Point Process of the 
High Supply Pattern. 
Our findings suggest that a Hawkes point process is not a viable method 
to model IED patterns. It is likely that Hawkes is unable to accurately model 
existing IED patterns due to the small number of observations; most work that 
studies self-exciting point processes considers at a minimum thousands of 
events (Masuda et al. 2012, Fox et al. 2015, Lewis et al. 2011). Hawkes point 
processes are commonly used with financial data, which capture observations 
every second, or millisecond of a trading day (Toke 2011). The result is a dataset 
with thousands to millions of data points that gradually fluctuate over time. As an 
example, Hawkes point process added predictive power when modeling civilian 
casualties in Iraq over the extent of the war but the dataset consisted of nearly 
sixteen thousand observations (Lewis et al. 2011). This is a stark contrast to the 
six to 25 IED events that we focus on here. 
E. NON-LINEAR (NL) OPTIMIZATION OF SINE CURVES 
Visual inspection of known patterns, specifically the pattern established in 
steady supply situations, reveals a sinusoidal-type curve (Figure 17). We next 
focus on fitting a curve using a sine function with the hope that the model would 
not only fit known patterns well, but be able to differentiate known patterns from 
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random data. Two techniques emerged during our research and both are based 
upon the same base equation (Equation 7) (Dunbar 2005).  
 sin( ( ))i iy A f x K    (7) 
Both require the estimation of four parameters: Amplitude (A), which is a 
measurement of the range of time between events; Frequency (f), representing 
how quickly the sine curve repeats; Phase-shift (φ), which captures where in the 
sin period the sequence starts; and Offset (K), which should correspond 
approximately to the mean or median of the inter-arrival time distribution.  
The first technique involves a NL optimization that solves for all necessary 
parameters; however, it is computationally expensive with long run times.  The 
second technique significantly reduces run time by estimating K (offset) as the 
inter-arrival mean (Equation 8), and A (amplitude) as half the range of the inter-
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Estimation of the offset and amplitude allow us to transform the original equation 
into a linear regression (Equation 10), since we now have estimates of A and K, 
and yi is the recorded inter-arrival times. The right side of the Equation 10 has 
the phase-shift and offset as the only unknown parameters remaining.  
 arcsin ( )i i
y K x f
A
    (10) 
Computational run times for a linear regression are trivial in comparison to 
a NL optimization but the NL optimization method generally produces a more 
accurate model fit when working with the small datasets we consider (Figure 22) 
(Dunbar 2005). After seeing the poor fit using the Hawkes point process 
methodology, we pursue the option that provides the best model fit, choosing the  
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NL optimization technique. This leaves the option of exploring the linear 
regression technique if run times prove to hinder our ability to fully analyze an 
area. 
 
Left Graph—Fit using estimation and transformation. Right Graph—Fit using NL 
optimization.  
Figure 22.  Sine Curve Fitting. Source: Dunbar (2005). 
1. Description of the Methodology 
Non-linear optimization (also known as non-linear programming) is a 
process that attempts to maximize or minimize an objective function by 
manipulating real variables over sets of constraints. Linear programs (LPs) and 
NLPs are normally calculated using a variety of algorithms that constitute a 
model solver built into various software packages. We choose to use the solver 
provided by Microsoft Excel as it is readily available to deployed military analysts, 
unlike many other optimization solvers that require expensive licenses. 
Moreover, its operation does not require the analyst to learn or understand a 
complex coding language.  
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This particular NLP requires the use of only one index, which is the 
sequence of IED events, and one set of given data, which is the recorded time 
between IED events in hours.  
 
Index Use 
 i є I  Sequence of IED events 
 
Given Data 
 yi   recorded time between each IED event (hours) 
 
The decision variables associated with this problem are the amplitude, 
frequency, phase-shift, and offset. The NLP algorithm will manipulate these 
variables to find an optimal solution to the objective function. Similar to the 
Hawkes Point Process, using the NLP solver in Excel requires initial estimates of 
the parameter values. We perturb these initial estimates of the decision variables 
for every iteration to increase our chances of finding the global minimum. We 
initialize the solver 50 times for each pattern test with random uniform starting 
values for the decision variables to mitigate the risk of constantly reporting the 
same local minimum. 
 
Decision Variables 
 Amplitude (A) measurement of the range of time between events [hours] 
 Frequency (f) measurement of how quickly the sine curve repeats 
[radians/sequence] 
 Phase-shift (φ) measurement of how far sine curve should shift along the 
sequence axis [sequence] 
 Offset (K) measurement of how far sine curve should shift along the 
time between event axis [hours] 
The final formulation consists of the objective function (Equation 11) and 
the constraints placed on the decision variables. Although this is an 
unconstrained problem, the solver built into Excel has difficulty solving this NL 
optimization without constraining the decision variables, which led us to develop 
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a set of very broad but logical constraints (Equations 12–15). We know that K is 
roughly the inter-arrival mean and A is roughly half the inter-arrival range so 
constraining those values from zero to 200 and -100 to 100, respectively, does 
not hinder the optimization. The phase-shift is constrained to the maximum 
number of IED events we will analyze. The last constraint simply ensures the 
model does not produce negative inter-arrival times (Equation 16). Lastly, the 
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2. Model Performance 
NL optimization of sine waves performed significantly better than Hawkes 
point process against all patterns we tested, including the random data. It 
captures the general curvature of all patterns and results in lower RMSE for all 
IED combinations (Table 8). The model fit of the steady supply pattern provides a 
good example of these results (Figure 23) and the remaining result visualizations 
appear in Appendix B. Visualization of Model Results. However, the NL approach 






Table 8.   Optimized Parameters and RMSE Results from Modeling IED 
Behavior Using NL Optimization of Sine Waves. 
 
 
Figure 23.  NL Optimization Model Fit of Steady Supply Pattern 
One disadvantage, as previously mentioned, is the long computational run 
times associate with NL optimization. We were regularly running into solver run 
times of over a minute for a single test (without perturbation) during the testing 
process. This presents a substantial issue when, as described in Chapter II, it 
may be necessary to test over one hundred forty-six thousand possible IED 
combinations in a sequence containing 25 events. There are three possible 
methods to reduce run-times using the built-in Excel solver. The first method 
involves lowering the constraint precision, which prevents the solver from re-
evaluating the objective function after miniscule changes in the decision 
variables. Another method is to change the convergence value, which ends a 
solver iteration if the solver cannot improve the objective value by the given 
threshold. Lastly, the option exists to place a simple time limit on how long a 
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single iteration can run. We used all these methods to significantly reduce our 
run times, changing the constraint precision to 0.001, the convergence value to 
0.01 and placing a limit of one second per iteration. However, using NL 
optimization to evaluate one hundred forty-six thousand possible combinations 
with only 10 perturbations would take over 400 hours even with these constraints 
in place. 
The other disadvantage is the model’s inability to distinguish between 
random data and known patterns. The resulting RMSEs (Table 8) suggest that 
the model fits the random data best of the four patterns considered. As discussed 
in Chapter II, one possible technique to help distinguish between pattern and IED 
noise is the establishment of the last two inter-arrival times as the test set which 
should better highlight the predictive abilities of the models. We explore this 
concept in Chapter IV. 
F. DISCRETE FOURIER TRANSFORMS  
The computational expense associated with the NL optimization prompted 
us to search for an additional methodology to efficiently model sinusoidal 
patterns. This led us to Discrete Fourier Transforms (DFTs). DFT is a particular 
algorithm associated with Fourier analysis that consists of decomposing a signal 
into individual harmonics (Smith 1997). It represents functions in terms of sines 
and cosines, which is appealing to IED application as we have a natural cyclical 
form to the most common types of IED patterns. Just as data is often fit to a 
polynomial function, which is a linear combination of power functions, the DFT 
represents the data as a linear combination of sine and cosine functions, which 
we can use to capture cyclical behavior. As previously mentioned in Chapter I.4, 
Helms described the technique of using DFTs to model crime activity and we 
believe it is an appropriate technique to model IED activity. 
 50
1. Description of the Methodology 
The general formulation of a DFT function appears in Equation 17 (Smith 
1997). It consists of a single constant, (N-1)/2 cosine terms, and (N-1)/2 sine 
terms where N represents the number of inter-arrivals in the IED combination.  
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Similar to a polynomial regression, a DFT model requires the estimation of the ah 
and bh parameters. Fortunately, there is a closed form equation to solve for these 
parameters as highlighted by Equations 18–19 where tj represents the recorded 
inter-arrival time between two events, h represents a single harmonic whose 
range is defined by Equation 20, and j represents the index of events where j=0 
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To prevent over-fitting, we will limit our exploration to DFT models with three 
terms (constant, one sine term, and one cosine) and with five terms (constant, 
two sine terms, and two cosine terms). We will refer to a DFT model with three 
terms as a single harmonic model and the model with five terms as a dual 
harmonic model for the remainder of this thesis.  
If we only want a model with one or two harmonics, we do not need to re-
calculate new parameters for each model; we can still use Equations 18–19. We 
just need to determine which index to use for the single harmonic model and 
which two indices to use for the dual harmonic model. Equation 21 allows us to 
rank-order harmonics, for h>0, according to their ability to summarize the data. 
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The maximum value returned by Equation 21 highlights the most influential 
harmonic and is defined as H1 in subsequent equations.  
 2 2h ha b  (21) 
Once we determine the most influential harmonic we can substitute the values of 
aH and bH into Equation 22 to estimate the inter-arrival times using a single 
harmonic model. If we would like to use a dual harmonic model, Equation 23 
adds the necessary terms where H1 represents the most influential harmonic and 
H2 represents the second most influential harmonic. Each additional harmonic 
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We perform our calculations in Microsoft Excel, but we can easily duplicate them 
using the FFT package in R. The results provide the necessary y i to compute 
the RMSE as outlined by Equation 1.  
2. Model Performance 
Table 9 highlights the RMSE results using DFT models and includes the 
estimated parameters, as well as the harmonics identified as the most influential. 
It also highlights the differences obtained when comparing DFT models and 
provides confirmation that using a dual harmonic model as compared to using a 
single harmonic model provides a more accurate data fit across the scenarios we 
tested. We also concluded that while a single harmonic model was adequate to 
capture a steady pattern, a dual harmonic model was necessary to model high 
and low supply due to the presence of near constant inter-arrivals between 
resupply (Figure 24). Visualization of model fit for the other patterns and random 
data can be found in Appendix B. Visualization of Model Results. 
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Table 9.   Discrete Fourier Transform Parameters and RMSE Results for 
Both Single and Double Harmonics. 
 
 
Figure 24.  Comparison of Model Fit of High-Supply Pattern Using Single 
Harmonic vs. Dual Harmonics. 
G. COMPARING DFT AND NL OPTIMIZATION 
Table 10 compares the RMSE results from DFT modeling to those 
obtained using the NL optimization methodology. NL optimization outperforms 
single harmonic models across all patterns and the random data, however, dual 
harmonic models produce smaller RMSE across all patterns except the steady 
supply pattern. These results are not unexpected since a single harmonic model 
uses three terms, NL optimization models use four, and the dual harmonic 
models use five. The primary benefit to using DFT modeling is the trivial 








Table 10.   Comparison of RMSE from Single and Dual Harmonic Models 
to NL Optimization Models 
 
 
The DFT methodology, like NL optimization, produced the lowest RMSEs 
for the random data. In every variation of DFT testing, the random data produced 
a lower RMSE suggesting that RMSE would not work well as a metric to signal a 
possible pattern. This presents a significant issue for this research as we would 
like to distinguish and highlight IED patterns for further investigation by an 
intelligence analyst. Rather than labeling NL optimization and DFTs as failed 
methodologies, Chapter IV will explore the results when the last two IED events 
of a given data filter are removed as a test set. It will also describe the results of 
using rolling predictions on the Iraq dataset and highlight the benefits of using 
DFT models in comparison to naïve models. 
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IV. DEVELOPING A TEST SET AND PREDICTING 
IRAQ IED EVENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will begin with an exploration of NL optimization and DFT 
model performance by predicting the inter-arrival times of the next two IED 
events after a training sample. We will also perform rolling horizon forecasting of 
IED activity in Iraq using the all three models (NL Optimization, DFT single and 
dual harmonic) and compare the results against naïve models. 
B. ESTABLISHING A TEST SET AGAINST KNOWN PATTERNS 
In order to test the predictive power of our models, we use the first N-2 
observations to fit the model and use the last two observations to examine the fit. 
We refer to this method as the “test-two” method for the remainder of this thesis. 
Applying this methodology to the test patterns described in Chapter III, only the 
first 12 inter-arrivals will be used to estimate model parameters. We continue to 
use root mean-squared error (RMSE) as the metric to compare model 
performance, but we only use the fit of the last two inter-arrivals in the 
calculation. Table 11 and 12 contain the results from applying the test-two 
methodology to the known patterns using the NL optimization model and the DFT 
model (both single and dual harmonic), respectively. We introduce the four test 
patterns in Chapter III, and they appear in Figures 17–20. It is important to stress 
that we only model and test four examples and we therefore cannot draw broad 
conclusions about the performance of these models across large datasets. 
However, the results highlight potential issues with pattern recognition using DFT 





Table 11.   RMSE of the Last Two Inter-Arrivals Using the NL 
Optimization Model. 
 
Table 12.   RMSE of the Last Two Inter-Arrivals Using Both Single and 
Double Harmonic Models. 
 
 
The tables include the estimated parameters for the models using the test-
two methodology as well as the RMSE results from both the original model and 
the new approach. The column labeled “Model all Data” contains the RMSE 
results from Chapter III where each model was fit, and the RMSE was calculated, 
across all 14 observations. The RMSE column contains the calculated results 
from using the test-two methodology and the RMSE difference (last column) 
highlights the changes in RMSE between the methodology used in Chapter III 
and the test-two methodology.  
One of the primary issues with both the NL optimization and DFT models, 
as described in Chapter III, is their inability to distinguish between random data 
and known patterns. Using the test-two methodology, the DFT single harmonic 
and the NL optimization models may provide some delineation between pattern 
and random data. All three methodologies produce higher RMSE modeling the 
random data using the test-two methodology (Table 1) than in the base case 
fitting all 14 observations in sample. This suggests that all three models are poor 
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at predicting random IED activity. Additionally, the DFT single harmonic model 
produces lower RMSE for the steady supply patterns and low supply patterns. 
When modeling the steady supply pattern, both the DFT single harmonic and NL 
optimization models produce better results than when they model random data. 
The poor performance of the DFT dual harmonic model may be the product of 
over-fitting. We next explore why the fit for the RMSE for the high supply model 
increases so much when we use the test-two approach. 
The high supply dataset experiences a RMSE increase double to 
quadruple (depending on the model) that of the random sequence. Comparing 
the data curves of the low supply pattern versus the high supply pattern as 
highlighted by Figures 25 and 26, respectively, provides a clear distinction in 
terms of the number of cycles present for modeling. The low supply pattern 
includes two full cycles while the high supply pattern only provides one and one-
half for the first 12 modeled observations. 
 
Figure 25.  DFT Single Harmonic Model Fit of Low Supply Pattern using 
Test Two Methodology. 
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Figure 26.  DFT Single Harmonic Model Fit of High Supply Pattern using 
Test Two Methodology. 
The DFT approach will produce a pattern that repeats periodically due to 
its sinusoidal form. Therefore, when estimating parameters for the DFT, it is 
better if the underlying data correspond to roughly an integer number of periods 
or cycles. For example, when we remove the last two observations from the low 
supply pattern, the remaining 12 observations form essentially two complete 
cycles and thus the DFT model produces reasonable results (Figure 25). The two 
complete transitions from long inter-arrivals to short inter-arrivals and back allows 
the model to identify the rough number of observations between large transitions. 
However, when we remove the last two observations from the high supply model 
in Figure 26, the remaining observations only form approximately 1.5 cycles, 
which prevents accurate modeling of long inter-arrivals. Figure 27 represents the 
same high supply pattern with two additional observations consistent with the 
pattern. Now that the training set constitutes two full cycles, the RMSE drops 
from 79.3 to 16.8. 
 59
 
Figure 27.  Full Cycle DFT Single Harmonic Model Fit of High Supply 
Pattern using Test Two Methodology. 
Modeling of the steady pattern using the test-two methodology produced 
varied results. Results degraded using both the NL optimization and DFT dual 
harmonic models (most likely the result of over-fitting) but improved using the 
DFT single harmonic model. The DFT single harmonic model did improve slightly 
using the test-two methodology (Figure 4) and it out performed the fit of the 
random data but it failed to produce an RMSE similar to the low supply pattern 
and high supply pattern after observations were added (RMSE<20). While Figure 
28 illustrates the DFT single harmonic model captures the oscillations reasonably 
well at a high level, there are significant errors in the model fit for certain 
observations. Unfortunately, accurate modeling of the steady supply pattern 
proves difficult for reasons similar to periodicity problems we saw with the high 
supply model, as well as the existence of variability in the number of 
observations before transitions between short and long inter-arrivals. These 
challenges limit the situations where DFT and NL optimization models perform 
well fitting steady supply patterns. Figures 29 and 30 provide a visual 
representation of situations where DFT models accurately portray steady supply 
patterns. Unsurprisingly, these examples highlight the need for consistent 
sinusoidal data with very low variability. The pattern in Figure 29 is consistent in 
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terms of the number of inter-arrivals between transitions (two short inter-arrivals 
and one long inter-arrivals) while Figure 30 confirms that accurate modeling of 
steady supply includes patterns with multiple arrivals between transitions. 
 
Figure 28.  DFT Single Harmonic Fit of Steady Supply Pattern 
Using Test-Two Methodology. 
 
Figure 29.  Accurate Model Fit of Consistent Steady Supply Pattern 
(Near Perfect Sinusoid). 
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Figure 30.  Accurate Model Fit of Steady Supply Pattern with 
Additional Inter-Arrivals before Transition 
Table 13 summarizes the results from Tables 11 and 12. It also provides a 
comparison of the RMSE results from our models against a new model that uses 
the mean inter-arrival of the first 12 observations to predict the last two 
observations. The mean inter-arrival model should perform better when modeling 
random inter-arrivals and limitless supply (visual flat line) as compared to the 
sinusoidal patterns we test. The results are as expected with the mean inter-
arrival model performing best against the random data set with the other models 
lagging far behind. The steady supply, high supply (after completing the cycle as 
previously discussed), and low supply are all modeled more accurately using the 
DFT single harmonic and NL optimization. The only unexpected result was the 
outperformance of the dual harmonic model by the mean inter-arrival against the 






Table 13.   Model RMSE Comparison against Mean Inter-arrivals 
 
 
The results of the test-two methodology suggest there may be some 
potential to delineate between pattern and randomness when using NL 
optimization and DFT single harmonic models. If the mean inter-arrival fits much 
better than the NL or DFT models, the observations probably do not form a 
legitimate pattern. The analysis also highlights some significant obstacles to 
accurate model fits. Chief among them are the need for complete cycles for high 
and low supply patterns as well as the need for consistent data when modeling 
steady supply patterns. Additional model testing is necessary and we will 
evaluate model performance after using the test-two methodology to model 
portions of the Iraq dataset. 
C. ROLLING HORIZON FORECASTING OF THE IRAQ DATASET 
To further test our models, we chose to perform rolling horizon forecasting 
to compare model performance against the mean inter-arrival rate across large 
subsets of Iraq data (Hyndman et al. 2006). This testing methodology allows us 
evaluate model performance with an “auto-pilot” approach. The first step is to 
filter the data in both space and time, which is followed by rolling predictions as 
we step through the data.  
We temporally filtered the data into 6-month blocks to ensure we capture 
enough data at a local level. The 6-month window also allows us to capture IED 
activity across transitional periods such as the “Sons of Iraq” movement, which 
could potentially affect model performance. We choose three testing time 
windows: September ’05 to February ’06, August ’06 to January ’07, and July ’07 
to December ‘07 (Figure 31). We next filter spatially based on natural spatial 
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breaks between IED clusters to narrow our focus (Figure 32). The filtering 
process produces eight spatio-temporal data subsets covering three 6-month 
windows over five different areas of Iraq (some subsets were of the same area 
but with a different temporal filter). The spatio-temporal subsets range from 114 
IEDs to 244 IEDs for a combined total of 1420 IEDs across all eight subsets. 
 
Figure 31.  Temporal Subsets for Rolling Horizon Forecasting. 
 
Figure 32.  Spatial Filtering for Rolling Horizon Forecasting (9.1 km). 
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Rolling horizon forecasting is a time step methodology wherein we shift 
the data window of interest forward at each step and consider a slightly different 
sequence from the previous step. In this case, we use rolling horizon forecasting 
in conjunction with the test-two methodology previously described. We start by 
examining the inter-arrival times 1 through m. We fit a model to these m 
observations and then predict the inter-arrival times m+1 and m+2. Based on the 
predictions of these two observations, we compute the RMSE. Here, m 
represents an appropriate number of observations to model (between 6 and 23 
as described in Chapter II). After the prediction of inter-arrival times m+1 and 
m+2, the rolling horizon forecast steps forward a single observation, fits the 
model to observations 2 through m+1, and predicts observations m+2 and m+3. 
(Figure 33). We continue this process throughout the dataset producing N-m-1 
RMSE values for each model (N is the number of inter-arrivals in a subset).  
The final step is to choose the number of observations for modeling and 
testing. We perform this analysis for varying observation lengths and produce 
similar results across the eight 6-month subsets. For our purposes, we choose to 
present the results of a modeling window of 14 total observations: 12 for model 
development and the last two observations to calculate RMSE values. These 
numbers are consistent with our previous models. We may obtain better results 
by varying the number of modeled observations depending on the geographic 
area or the number of inter-arrivals in a subset. 
 
Figure 33.  Visual Representation of Rolling Horizon Forecasting. 
 65
Table 14 summarizes the results of the rolling horizon forecasting across 
all eight spatio-temporal subsets producing 1328 RMSE values per model (DFT 
single and dual, NL optimization, mean inter-arrival). The mean inter-arrival 
model produces the lowest RMSE 42 percent of the time, DFT single and dual 
harmonic 16 and 17 percent of the time, respectively, and the NL optimization 
model is the best performer 24 percent of the time. The better performance of the 
mean inter-arrival model is not surprising, as a majority of the IED sequences 
modeled do not constitute a legitimate sinusoidal pattern. As previously 
discussed, the mean inter-arrival performs better in situations with un-patterned 
data. The last row in Table 14 measures how often that particular model 
performed better than the mean inter-arrival. The similarity between these 
numbers is also expected since combinations of IEDs better modeled by a single 
sinusoidal model are likely to also be better modeled by multiple sinusoidal 
models when compared to the mean inter-arrival. 




D. TESTING CANDIDATE PATTERNS FROM THE IRAQ DATA 
The results of our rolling horizon forecast suggest that if we apply these 
methodologies blindly across an entire dataset, the mean inter-arrival model out-
performs any of our sinusoidal models. Without further analysis, we could 
conclude that the mean inter-arrival is the most predictive of the four and should 
be used in all situations. We next focus on only a small number of sequences 
that appear to be patterns. We examine the model performance against these 
potential patterns from the Iraq data and compare the results to those obtained 
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using the rolling horizon analysis for the entire dataset discussed in the previous 
section. 
To accomplish this, we inspected the inter-arrival curves for all 1328 IED 
sequences tested during the rolling horizon forecast to identify likely candidate 
patterns. We select only the curves that, in my personal experience, would 
warrant a briefing to my commander and a request for assets. We perform this 
selection process without consulting any models or additional metrics; we only 
performed a visual inspection. We identify 19 patterns, which highlights how rare 
IED pattern recognition is in a deployed environment. Figures 34 and 35 are 
examples of the curves we identify as patterns, which have distinct sinusoidal 
shapes consistent with the steady and high supply patterns, respectively. 
 
Figure 34.  Example of Steady Supply Pattern from the Iraq Data. 
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Figure 35.  Example of High Supply Pattern from the Iraq Data.  
Any pattern identification process (such as this visual inspection 
procedure) has false positives and false negatives. False positives are IED 
sequences that we identify as patterns that are not actually patterns. A related 
issue is legitimate patterns that are disrupted before the next event and do not 
continue into the future. From an operational point of view, false positives and 
disrupted patterns are equivalent, as we are unlikely to deploy assets in an 
effective manner to interdict the next IED based on these observations. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests 40–50 percent of patterns identified by visual 
inspection are either false positives or disrupted patterns. False negatives are 
patterns that are not identified, often due to the existence of IED noise, and/or 
incorrect filtering of space, time, or type of IED device. Table 15 has the same 
structure as Table 14 and provides summary results for fitting these identified 
potential patterns with our models. The results are significantly different than the 










Of the 19 identified patterns, the mean inter-arrival model is never the best 
model to use. The DFT Double Harmonic model performs the best 58 percent of 
the time. The performance of the DFT single harmonic model and NL 
optimization models in comparison to the mean is significant. They out-performed 
(produced lower RMSE) 84 and 90 percent of the time, respectively. Using this 
set of data as an example, the current pattern detection approach would require 
the analyst to inspect all 1328 sequences visually (our first step in this process). 
These results suggest that analysts attempting to find patterns can significantly 
improve search efficiency if they start with IED combinations where the DFT 
single harmonic or the NL optimization models perform better than the mean 
inter-arrival. Since DFT single harmonic and NL optimization out-perform mean 
inter-arrival roughly 30 percent of the time individually (see Table 14), analysts 
could reduce workload by 70 percent. Analysts narrowing their focus to 
sequences where NL optimization or DFT single harmonic perform better than 
the mean inter-arrival would still need to go through nearly 400 sequences 
(1328*0.3). However, these 400 would contain 90 percent (using NL 
optimization) and 84 percent (using DFT) of the identified patterns in this 
example. Figures 36 and 37 provide a visual representation of two of the 19 
identified patterns as well as the fit of all four models. Further examples appear in 
Appendix C. Model Fits of Candidate Iraq Patterns. 
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Figure 36.  Model fits of Confirmed Steady Supply Pattern from 
the Iraq Dataset. 
 
 
Figure 37.  Model fits of Confirmed High Supply Pattern from 
the Iraq Dataset. 
Our final analysis evaluates model performance when predicting the next 
event of an identified pattern. In most situations, analysts spend a majority of 
time attempting to identify patterns. When an analyst identifies a pattern, it is 
common practice to determine the most likely time for the next event by visually 
inspecting the inter-arrival curve in combination with historic day of week and 
time of day analysis for the local area. This type of analysis might also consider 
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type of device or initiation. Adding this additional analysis helps reduce the false 
positive rate by eliminating illogical patterns and predictions. In practice, analysts 
would use more than just the inter-arrival time information to predict the future 
IED events. However, we are curious to see how our models performs with only 
historic inter-arrival times as input. 
The 19 patterns we identify in the Iraq dataset are the baseline in this 
analysis. Since they are likely pattern candidates, we develop the model based 
on all 14 observations and predict the 15th. Table 16 provides the results and the 
mean inter-arrival model performs the best when we consider all 19 patterns. 
These results are not surprising since our identified patterns include sequences 
where the 15th observation deviates significantly from previous pattern behavior. 
Figure 38 provides an example visual representation of a candidate pattern with 
a deviation in the 15th observation. The red dot represents a consistent inter-
arrival value if the pattern persists past the 14th observation. If we examine the 
results of only the patterns that persist through the 15th observation, the NL 
optimization model produces a lower RMSE than the mean inter-arrival (Figure 
39). Relying on personal experience, 11 of 19 of the candidate patterns meet this 
criterion based on visual inspection of the sinusoidal pattern established with the 
first 14 observations. 
Table 16.   RMSE from Predicting the 15th Event of 




Figure 38.  Pattern Deviation of the 15th Observation 
from Iraq Pattern Candidates. 
 
Figure 39.  Pattern Consistency with the 15th Observation 
from Iraq Pattern Candidates. 
Even though we cherry-pick the results in the 2nd row of Table 16, it 
highlights why our methodology may have some operational relevance. All 19 of 
our identified patterns are strong enough candidates to apply either route 
clearance or surveillance assets with the goal of finding the device or disrupting 
the emplacement. In a deployed environment, the analyst only has access to the 
first 14 events of any of these patterns and his “best guess” for the next event is 
going to be a continuation of the current pattern. If the pattern does not continue, 
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either because it is a false positive or it was disrupted, then it is unlikely any 
method (including the mean) will accurately predict the timing of the next event. 
This appears to be the case in 8 of the 19 potential patterns, which is consistent 
with my experience that 40–50 percent of visually identified patterns do not 
continue. However, if the pattern persists, our results suggest that using a NL 
optimization model provides reasonable prediction of the 15th event in the 
absence of additional information. From an operational point of view, this is 
important as our methods perform better when the pattern persists and will 
perform similarly (i.e., poorly) when the pattern does not continue when 




IEDs provided a significant threat to U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Their success against superior forces ensures their continued use 
as the insurgent weapon of choice. Intelligence analysts attempting to recognize 
and identify IED patterns at a local level have a difficult task. There is no “silver 
bullet” to IED pattern recognition and prediction, but it is crucial that IED analysts 
take advantage of every insurgent mistake in the form of predictable patterns. A 
single IED cell can emplace hundreds of IEDs before presenting a predictable 
pattern. In my 24 months of deployment time as an intelligence analyst for a 
route clearance battalion, my team successfully identified and disrupted only four 
recognized patterns. Finding a better, more efficient, way to recognize IED 
patterns is necessary. 
While this thesis unfortunately did not produce results that would identify 
patterns with low false positives and false negatives, the methods and models 
discussed in this thesis have potential to reduce IED analyst workload. Analysts 
do not have time to continuously search for patterns with competing 
requirements. Our results suggest that an analyst who focuses on IED 
sequences where the NL optimization or the DFT single harmonic model out-
performs the mean inter-arrival model may be able to reduce the amount of 
sequences analyzed while still considering most of the visually recognizable 
patterns. When we applied our methodology, the workload was reduced by 70 
percent but the remaining sequences contained 90 percent of the candidate 
patterns. This requires the analyst to evaluate nearly 400 IED sequences; a 
formidable task, but much more easily accomplished than the evaluation of the 
original 1328 IED sequences. Additionally, we establish that NL optimization 
models predict the inter-arrival of the next observation fairly well in situations 
where an identified pattern persists. This is a useful operational result. 
We also identify and discuss the shortfalls of our models. We initially 
focused on the Hawkes point process, but did not pursue it because of its 
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inability to accurately model small datasets. We examined sinusoidal models 
such as DFT and NL optimization. Sinusoidal models require data to be in near 
full cycles, which considerably increases the importance of selecting the right 
number of observations. As an example, our modeling of the high supply pattern 
produced poor results until we added two more observations, which completed a 
cycle. We found that, in general, the DFT dual harmonic model is prone to 
overfitting and produced the worst results of the models tested. Lastly, our NL 
optimization model arguably performed the best, in both pattern delineation and 
IED prediction, but requires considerable run times and would not be suitable for 
datasets exceeding several thousand sequences. Most tactical level modeling 
performed on a daily/weekly basis would only require an analyst to consider 
usually well less than 100 observations. However, more in depth analysis  
would remove certain observations and only focus on a subset of the original 
dataset. For example, if the original data set has only 24 inter-arrival times, the 
analyst might want to consider subsets of size 15 and evaluate whether any of 
these subsets form patterns. The analysis quickly becomes computationally 
burdensome when we consider subsets.  
We conclude that even though the DFT single harmonic model performs 
slightly worse than the NL optimization, its run times are trivial making it the 
model of choice when it is necessary to examine large numbers of sequences. 
As discussed above, a potential topic for future work is the exploration of how to 
generate and evaluate sequences that are subsets of the dataset to maximize 
pattern identification while minimizing false positives and false negatives. This 
may involve additional variables such as initiation or explosive type. An analyst 
may want to account for the possibility of IED noise by ignoring certain 
observations and focusing on non-continuous subsets of the most recent IED 
activity. We discuss IED noise in Chapter II, but do not incorporate it into our 
analysis in Chapters III and IV. As discussed in Chapter III, evaluating subsets is 
a computationally expensive process since it is necessary to check every 
possible sequence of length 6,7,8, etc. for a given dataset. Unfortunately, this will 
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produce millions (if not many more) of sequences to consider and will likely result 
in a large number of false positives. Future research can examine more 
sophisticated ways to subset the data. One possibility is to start the analysis with 
a small subset and grow that subset by adding the observations most likely to 
accentuate an existing pattern or highlight a new pattern not previously seen.  
There are other opportunities for future work. Our results suggest that 
sinusoidal models perform best with complete cycles, and determining the 
number of events to model is crucial to the identification of possible patterns. 
Future research could explore the possibility of a dynamic approach where an 
analyst begins with a fixed number of observations but the model is free to 
include or exclude a set number of inter-arrivals to improve the pattern. It may be 
worthwhile to determine if these models perform better or worse in urban versus 
rural environments. There tend to be many more insurgent groups operating in 
close proximity in urban environments. Sometimes these groups are coordinated, 
but often they are not, which makes uncovering IED patterns more difficult. 
Lastly, it is vital that the NL optimization and DFT single harmonic model are 
implemented into a VBA based tool for deployed analysts. Analysts have very 
few tools at their disposal to visualize IED patterns, and none that can help focus 
their efforts by eliminating possible sequences. Analysts often create their own 
searching mechanism but a tool with these models built in has the potential to 
benefit units searching for IED patterns.  
The objective of this thesis is to explore methodologies to help deployed 
analyst identify IED patterns. Although we do not develop a single method that 
provides the analyst with all the solutions, we formulate a particular set of models 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 77
APPENDIX A.  SCRIPTS 




###Function to determine log-likelihood### 
neg.loglik <- function(params, data, opt=TRUE) { 
   
  #baseline rate that events occur 
  mu <- params[1] 
  #immediate jump value 
  alpha <- params[2] 
  #decay rate 
  beta <- params[3] 
  #data is time of the events 
  t <- sort(data) 
   
  #r is intermediate value need to define recursively 
  r <- rep(0,length(t)) 
  for(i in 2:length(t)) { 
    r[i] <- exp(-beta*(t[i]-t[i-1]))*(1+r[i-1]) 
  } 
   
  loglik <- -tail(t,1)*mu 
  loglik <- loglik+alpha/beta*sum(exp(-beta*(tail(t,1)-t))-1) 
  loglik <- loglik+sum(log(mu+alpha*r)) 
  if(!opt) { 
    return(list(negloglik=-loglik, mu=mu, alpha=alpha, beta=beta, t=t, 
                r=r)) 
  } 
  else { 
    return(-loglik) 
  } 
} 
 






for (j in 1:1000) { 
 # Determine values for (mu, alpha, beta) using loglik function 
 opt <- optim(par=c(runif(1,0,10),runif(1,0,10),runif(1,0,10)), 
fn=neg.loglik, data=tVec, lower = c(0.0000001,0.00000001,0.0000001),  method = 
"L-BFGS-B") 
 opt$par 
 if (opt$par[3]>100) next 
 if (opt$par[2]>opt$par[3]) next 
 #Simulate hawkes 1000 times using calculated parameters and combine into 
dataframe 
 sim.mat=as.matrix(tVec) 
 if (opt$value<best.value) { 
  best.value=opt$value 
  best.para=opt$par 
    } 
  } 
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for (i in 2:1001){ 
 temp.df=data.frame(sim.mat[,i]) 




#Calculation of RMSE for every simulation 
rmse.vec=numeric(0) 





#calculate RMSE Average 
rmse.mean=mean(rmse.vec) 
 




#Read in the data 
nai.df=read.csv('Virginia_sep05-feb06.csv',header=T,stringsAsFactors=F) 
 
#Clean the data 







#Initialize empty list and vector 
m.rmse.list=list() 
m.rmse.mean=numeric() 
#Loop through sequence lengths 
for (event.count in 7:22) { 
 #Initialize and empty vector after each length 
 temp.vec=numeric() 
 #Loop through events for running prediction and capture the RMSE from two 
predicted events 
 for (j in 1:(N-event.count-1)) { 
  temp.mean=mean(ia.vec[j:(event.count+j-1)]) 
  temp.pred=rep(temp.mean,2) 
 
 temp.rmse=rmse(ia.vec[(j+event.count):(j+event.count+1)],temp.pred) 
  temp.vec[j]=temp.rmse 
 } 
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 #populate a list with the RMSE 
 m.rmse.list[event.count]=list(temp.vec) 












for (event.count in 7:22) { 
 temp.vec=numeric() 
 for (j in 1:(N-event.count-1)) { 
  temp.LIA=ia.vec[(j+event.count-1)] 
  temp.pred=rep(temp.LIA,2) 
 
 temp.rmse=rmse(ia.vec[(j+event.count):(j+event.count+1)],temp.pred) 

















for (event.count in 7:22) { 
 temp.vec=numeric() 
 temp.vec2=numeric() 
 for (j in 1:(N-event.count-1)) { 
  tVec=ia.vec[j:(event.count+j-1)] 
  M=length(tVec) 
  #get fourier transform from built in R functions 
  yk = fft(tVec)/length(tVec) 
  Avec = rep(0,1+floor((M-1)/2)) 
  Avec = 2*Re(yk[1:length(Avec)]) 
  #get the coefficient for B 
  Bvec = -2*Im(yk[1:length(Avec)]) 
  sqrCoefficients = Avec[2:length(Avec)]^2+Bvec[2:length(Avec)]^2 
  I = which.max(sqrCoefficients ) 
  sqrCoefficients[I]=0 
  I2 = which.max(sqrCoefficients)   
  ffBestHarmonic = Avec[1]/2+ Avec[I+1]*cos(2*pi*I*(0:(M+1))/M) + 
Bvec[I+1]*sin(2*pi*I*(0:(M+1))/M) 
  ffBest2 = Avec[1]/2+ Avec[I+1]*cos(2*pi*I*(0:(M+1))/M) + 
Bvec[I+1]*sin(2*pi*I*(0:(M+1))/M) +  
     Avec[I2+1]*cos(2*pi*I2*(0:(M+1))/M) + 
Bvec[I2+1]*sin(2*pi*I2*(0:(M+1))/M) 
  temp.pred=tail(ffBestHarmonic,2) 






  temp.vec[j]=temp.rmse 
















C. VBA SCRIPT FOR RUNNING HORIZON FORECAST OF NL 
OPTIMIZATION 
Sub Peturb() 
        NL_Optim.Range("B2").Formula = Rnd() * 100 
        NL_Optim.Range("B3").Formula = (Rnd() * ((-1) ^ Int(Rnd() * 10))) * 25 
        NL_Optim.Range("B4").Formula = (Rnd() * ((-1) ^ Int(Rnd() * 10))) * 25 




    Dim i, j As Integer 
    Dim StartTime As Double 
    Dim MinutesElapsed As String 
    Dim A1, A2, W1, W2, P1, P2, O, bestSSE, rmse2 As Double 
    Dim N As Integer 
    StartTime = Timer 
    NL_Optim.Range("H1") = 0 
    N = Data.Range("B1", Data.Range("B1").End(xlDown)).Count 
    For j = 0 To N - 14 
        NL_Optim.Range("C11:C24").Value = Data.Range("A1:A14").Offset(j).Value 
        NL_Optim.Range("H2") = j 
        bestSSE = 1000000 
        For i = 0 To 9 
            Call Peturb 
            SolverSolve UserFinish:=True, ShowRef:="ShowTrial" 
            If IsNumeric(NL_Optim.Range("E7").Value) Then 
                If NL_Optim.Range("E7").Value < bestSSE Then 
                    A1 = NL_Optim.Range("B2") 
                    W1 = NL_Optim.Range("B3") 
                    P1 = NL_Optim.Range("B4") 
                    O = NL_Optim.Range("B5") 
                    bestSSE = NL_Optim.Range("E7") 
                    rmse2 = NL_Optim.Range("G6") 
                End If 
            End If 
        NL_Optim.Range("H1") = i 
        Next i 
        Result.Range("C2").Offset(j) = A1 
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        Result.Range("D2").Offset(j) = W1 
        Result.Range("E2").Offset(j) = P1 
        Result.Range("F2").Offset(j) = O 
        Result.Range("B2").Offset(j) = rmse2 
        Result.Range("A2").Offset(j) = j + 13 
    Next j 
  MinutesElapsed = Format((Timer - StartTime) / 86400, "hh:mm:ss") 
  MsgBox "This code ran successfully in " & MinutesElapsed & " minutes", 
vbInformation 
End Sub   
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APPENDIX B.  VISUALIZATION OF MODEL RESULTS 
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